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Abstract

This paper examines the incentives of private actors to invest in cybersecurity.
Prior analyses have examined investments in security goods, such as locks or safes
that have the characteristics of private goods. The analysis in this paper extends
this analysis to examine expenditures on security goods, such as information, that
have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the private goods case,
where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case can result in the underproduction of security
expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods,
and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should
be a central feature of such organizations.
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the incentives of private actors to invest in cybersecurity.
Prior analyses have examined investments in security goods, such as locks or
safes that have the characteristics of private goods. The analysis in this paper
extends this analysis to examine expenditures on security goods, such as
information, that have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the
private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can
lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case can result in the
underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the
formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the
production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced
by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations.

I. INTRODUCTION
It is well documented that private citizens spend large amounts on private security
measures. These security expenditures include everything from simple devices
such as door locks and bars on windows to elaborate electronic security systems
and private security guards. Unlike general law enforcement expenditures, these
protection expenditures are often aimed at the direct prevention of loss, and do not
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necessarily rely upon ex-post sanctions to reduce the net gain from criminal
activity.1
The use of private security measures is likely to be important in the
cybersecurity context. Use of private resources, including resources aimed at
gathering information about the nature and frequency of past and future cyber
attacks may be efficient given the decentralized nature of the internet. Further,
traditional deterrence through ex-post sanctions may be difficult to implement in
this setting for several reasons. Private resources aimed at identifying and
pursuing those responsible for cyber attacks often will inure to the benefit of
others, and thus are likely to be under produced.2 As a result, those responsible
for cyber attacks may perceive that they face low probabilities of punishment.3

For analyses of private law enforcement systems, see Gary Becker and George Stigler, Law
Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J Legal Stud 1 (1974); William M.
Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J Legal Stud 1 (1975); David
Friedman, Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case, 8 J Leg Stud 399 (1979);
David Friedman, Efficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law, 13 J Legal Stud 379
(1984). See also Doug Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers
Accountable, _ Sup Ct Econ Rev _ (2005) (discussing use of vicarious liability as a way to
increase security and law enforcement).
2
The Microsoft Corporation recent announced the initial $5 million funding of the Anti-Virus
Reward Program that would pay bounties for information that leads to the arrest and conviction of
those responsible for launching malicious viruses and worms on the Internet. See Microsoft Press
Release, November 5, 2003. For a discussion of bounties generally, see Becker and Stigler, 3 J
Legal Stud 1 (cited in note 1). Microsoft, owing to its large market share, can internalize more of
the benefits of private enforcement expenditures. However, its large market share and its de facto
standard status also serves to lower the costs of conducting a widespread cyber attack, and has also
resulted a many attacks directed at computers using Microsoft products. For an analysis of the
tradeoffs involved with de facto standards in the cybersecurity context, see Randy Picker, Raising
Transactions Costs and Network Security: Of Heterogeneity and Autarky, in The Law &
Economics of Cybersecurity, M. Grady and F. Parisi, eds. (Cambridge forthcoming 2005).
3
Indeed, this result in not exogenous. Rather, it is a result of the fact the benefits from efforts by
private citizens to apprehend and identify such individuals produce external benefits that, absent
adequate civil judgments of bounties, inure to the benefit of others.
1
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This in turn requires that large magnitude punishment be used for optimal
deterrence, a difficult task given the difficulty of obtaining meaningful civil
judgments against many of the defendants. The large volume and inchoate nature
of many of the attacks may also make the authorities reluctant to impose large
criminal penalties on individuals for such behavior.4
Prior economic analyses on security expenditures have examined potential
divergences in the private and social incentives to provide private security
measures.5 These studies have shown that the private and social incentives to
provide investments in security diverge due to an inability to internalize positive
and negative externalities generated by private security investments.6
Specifically, positive spillovers include the effect of expenditures that reduce the
ex-ante net benefit of crime, and thus serve as a general deterrent to such activity.
These expenditures can include expenditures aimed at identifying those
responsible for criminal acts, and resources that minimize the harm that occurs as
a result of crimes. Negative spillovers include the effect of expenditures that
serve to divert criminal activity from those who invest in private security to those

4

The paper does not consider the use of public sanctions and enforcement resources. The level of
public enforcement will generally affect the level of private expenditures. For example, public
enforcement and sanctions may serve to “crowd out” private expenditures. For an analysis of
punishment for attempts, see Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J
Legal Stud 435 (1990), David D. Friedman, Impossibility, Subjective Probability, and Punishment
for Attempts, 20 J Legal Stud 179 (1991).
5
Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private versus Socially Optimal
Behavior, 11 Intl Rev L & Econ 123 (1991).
6
Id. See also Charles T. Clotfelter, Private Security and the Public Safety, 5 J Urban Econ 388
(1978).
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who have not. The inability to internalize these spillover effects will result in the
underproduction of the security expenditures that serve to generally deter crime,
and can result in a relative overproduction of resources that serve mainly to divert
criminals less protected targets.7
This paper extends the current literature on the private security
investments by explicitly examining the issue of the investment and production of
intangible security goods. The intangible nature of security inputs distinguishes
the cybersecurity setting from the standard setting examined that involves private
goods such as door locks. Specifically, security expenditures in the cybersecurity
setting often involve investments in information, including information on the
nature and frequency of cyber attacks, information on future attacks, and
information on existing vulnerabilities and potential defenses. These
cybersecurity expenditures have the characteristics of classic informational public
goods. The existence of public security goods requires an analysis that examines
the rate at which such assets are produced in addition to the question of how such
assets are deployed.
It is shown that security investments in public goods can increase the
divergence between the private and social incentives to produce and deploy
security assets relative to the private security goods case. Specifically,
independent individual security expenditures on non appropriable public goods
Koo Hui-Wen and I. P. L. Png, Private Security: Deterrent or Diversion? 14 Intl Rev L & Econ
87 (1994).
7
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can lead to free riding and underproduction. The potential for free riding suggests
that a legal or market response is required to insure the adequate production of
public good security expenditures. This paper examines how alternative private
institutions, such as intellectual property protection, secrecy, or the use of
contractual security collectives might address the pubic good problem.8
The article is organized as follows. Section II reviews the existing
literature on the private production of security by examining the deployment of an
existing set of security measures. Section III alters the model to consider the
production of intangible security assets. Section IV considers production and
deployment with secrecy or intellectual property protection. Section V concludes.
II. THE PRIVATE PRODUCTION OF PRIVATE SECURITY GOODS
Prior studies of the private production of security have examined the consequence
of two non-internalized spillover effects that result from such expenditures. The
first spillover effect is the positive effect that these expenditures have on reducing
crime and other socially costly acts. For example, consider investments in
security that serve to decrease the net benefits of crime or other types of wealth
transferring activity. If such investments are not observable ex-ante, such
expenditures not only decrease the expected losses to the person that makes the
investment, but it also has a general deterrent effect that reduces the overall level

8

For a description of some of the institutions that have arisen to counter the cybercommons
problem, see Emily Frye, The Tragedy of the Cybercommons: Overcoming Fundamental
Vulnerabilities to Critical Infrastructure in a Networked World, 58 Bus L 349 (2002).
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of criminal activity. If the general deterrent effect is not internalized by those
making these investments, such investments are will be underproduced.9
In contrast, if the existence (and lack) of such investments are observable
to the criminal ex-ante, then criminals will be deterred from attacking a specific
target. However, they may instead substitute a more protected target for a less
protected one. Indeed, this substitution effect is more likely when alternative
targets are close substitutes and of high value relative to the cost of committing
the criminal act.10 In such cases expenditures merely divert crime to other targets
rather than generally deterring crime. In equilibrium, it is possible that there is an
inefficient substitution away from generally deterring investments toward such
crime diverting investments.
To examine the economic incentives to invest in private security, consider
a model of observable private security expenditures in a world without public
enforcement.11 In this model, there are h web sites and t hackers. Hackers engage
in the unauthorized entry of sites, and such unauthorized entry of a site results in a
gain to the hacker. The unauthorized entry also causes a loss to the site, which

9

See Shavell, 11 Intl Rev L & Econ (cited in note 5).
See Hui-Wen and P’ng, 14 Intl Rev L & Econ (cited in note 7).
11
The basic model is from Shavell. See Shavell, 11 Intl Rev L & Econ 123 (cited in note 5).
Given the nature of cybercrime, where the release of costly viruses and worms is not accompanies
by monetary or significant utility gains by the hacker, the model in this section is modified to
allow for costly criminal activity where the loss from an attack l is greater than the gain g to the
criminal. Shavell’s model assumed that the activity inducing the security expenditures took the
form of costless transfers.
10

6
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art26

can be different than the gain to the hacker.12 In the absence of observable
differences, hackers randomly choose between the h sites. Each of the t hackers
choose a level of effort e in order to maximize the net gain from unauthorized
entry:13

G(e,x) = eg(x) – c(e),

(1)

where c(e) is the cost of effort, and g(x) is the gain to the hacker.14 The
amount of the gain from unauthorized entry into a site will be a decreasing
function of the level of site’s security expenditures x.15 The hacker’s first order
condition is given by

g(x) = c’(e),

(2)

12

The two are equal only when the unauthorized entry results in a costless transfer from the site to
the hacker.
13
Heuristically, e is the number of attacks initiated by a hacker.
14
It is assumed that g’(x) < 0, g”(x) > 0. c’(e) > 0, and c”(e) > 0. Note that in many cases, a
hacker can simultaneously launch cyber-attacks at many sites (e.g., through a cleverly designed
worm or virus, suggesting decreasing returns. However, diminishing returns will apply to the up
front effort and resources needed to initiate the attack, with increases in e resulting in a more
widespread attack.
15
In this model, expenditures on security have a protective effect, that is, they reduce the amount
of gain to the hacker when an attack is launched, and also reduces the amount of loss suffered by
the site (and its users) when an attack takes place.
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so that e = e(x).16

Implicitly differentiating the first order condition yields:

e’(x) = g’(x)/c”(e) < 0.17

(3)

This means that security expenditures decrease efforts by hackers to enter
sites. If all potential victims choose equal levels of security expenditures, the
frequency of unauthorized entry φ(x) faced by each of h sites equals

φ (x) = (t/h)e(x).

(4)

Intuitively, if all sites have the same equilibrium security, then hackers
will attack sites randomly. Thus, the total number of attacks, t*e(x), will be
uniformly distributed among the h sites.

16

As noted in note 15, supra, the direct effect of security expenditures is to decrease the gain from
any given attack, which in turn decreases the incentive of the hacker to expend costly effort at
mounting attacks. This model does not consider expenditures that directly affect the effort of
hackers independent of altering the expected gain from an attack. Modification of the model
would then require that firms consider two types of expenditures, those that reduce the loss when
attacks occur, and those that alter hackers’ incentives directly. If we denote the latter type of
expenditures by z, then the hacker’s effort function can be expressed as e = e(x,z). Such
expenditures would be more akin to law enforcement expenditures that are generally publicly
provided, such as efforts to detect and subsequently sanction those that commit attacks, and are
not considered in this paper.
17
Following Shavell, it is assumed that e”(x) > 0. See Shavell, 11 Intl Rev L & Econ 123 (cited
in note 5).
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If all h sites simultaneously increase x, the marginal effect on the
frequency that a given site will suffer an attack is given by

φ’(x) = (t/h)e’(x).18

(5)

Potential victims are assumed to choose observable security expenditures
x to minimize the cost of these expenditures plus the expected loss from crime:

Lo(x) = φ (x|x’)l(x) + x,

(6)

where x’ is the level of expenditures of others, φ (x|x’) is the frequency
that a site will suffer a loss given expenditures x and x’,19 and l(x) is the
magnitude of the loss to the victim.20 The first order condition is given by

18

This formulation assumes that hackers independently choose which site to attack, and that sites
can be profitably attacked numerous times.
19
If we assume that hackers observe the level of xi with error εi, and these observation errors are
independent, then the probability that a given hacker will choose to attack site i equals the
probability that εi < x’ – x + ε(1), where ε(1) is the lowest order statistic given h-1 draws. If the
error terms εi have a probability density function given by f(εi), and cumulative density function
given by F(εi) then the probability that a site will be the subject of any given attack equals. The
frequency of attacks will equal φ(x|x’) = te(x)F(x’ – x + ε(1)).
20
We assume that l’(x) < 0, and l”(x) >0. This assumption is consistent with expenditures on
security reducing the losses suffered by attacked sites, but with diminishing returns. In a more
complex model, this may not be the case. For example, higher levels of security may be
simultaneously associated with higher costs for legitimate transactions. For example, the use of
trusted systems may deter some consumers from visiting sites that use such systems. The
resulting foregone transactions can at some point outweigh the decreased loss from unauthorized
transactions, causing l’(x) to be positive. For purposes of this paper, we assume that the relevant
range includes levels of security expenditures in which l’(x) < 0.
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-φ1(x|x’)l(x) – φ (x|x’)l’(x) = 1.

(7)

Assuming that φ (x|x) = φ (x), the first order condition under conditions of
symmetry (x’ = x) becomes:

-φ1(x|x)l(x) – φ (x)l’(x) = 1.

(8)

Let xo denote the solution to (8).

As an alternative to uncoordinated security expenditures, sites could
cooperatively choose security levels to eliminate the diversionary spillover
effects. If h sites collectively agree on a uniform level of expenditures, they
would choose a level of expenditures to minimize

h φ (x)l(x) + hx.

(9)

The first order condition is given by

- φ’(x)l(x) – φ (x)l’(x) = 1.

(10)
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http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art26

Let x* denote the solution to the cooperative first order condition (10).

Finally, we can consider the social optimum, which considers the cost of
resources used by the hackers and the losses caused by their behavior. The social
objective function is to minimize the costs of precaution by the sites and effort by
the hackers plus the amount of social loss from the unauthorized activity:

hx + t(c(e(x)) + e(x)s(x)).

(11)

Where s(x) = l(x) – g(x) is the social cost of the hacker’s activity.

The first order condition equals:

-(t/h)(c’(e)e’(x) + s’(x)e(x) + s(x)e’(x)) = 1.

(12)

The social first order condition can be rewritten as

-φ’(x)(c’(e) + s(x)) – φ (x)s’(x) = 1

(13)

Given that the hacker sets the marginal cost of effort equal to the gain
from the crime, g(x) = c’(e), and the first order condition is given by:
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-φ’(x)l(x) – φ (x)s’(x) = 1

(14)

Table 1 lists the three first order conditions for the individual, cooperative,
and social objective functions in the private goods case.

Table 1 – First Order Conditions: Private Goods Case

First Order Condition

Level of Security

Social

-φ’(x)l(x) – φ (x)s’(x) = 1.

x**

Individual

-φ1(x|x’)l(x) – φ (x|x’)l’(x) = 1.

xo

Cooperatives

- φ’(x)l(x) – φ (x)l’(x) = 1.

x*

Assuming that –s’(x) = -l’(x) + g’(x) < -l’(x), it is clear that x* > x**.
That is, the cooperatives have an incentive to overinvest in security expenditures.
Intuitively, a cooperative’s marginal incentive to invest in security is based upon
the marginal reduction in the loss including the amount of the transfer, while
social incentives are based upon the smaller loss net of the transfer amount. These
additional expenditures on security are induced by a desire to reduce the amount
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of the transfer, which is not a social loss.21 This overinvestment effect is most
pronounced in the case of pure transfers that are large in magnitude.22 On the
other hand, this effect is small for crimes that cause large losses relative to the
gains to the criminal.23
The relationship between the individual, uncoordinated level of security
and the collective amount is ambiguous, and depends upon both the magnitude of
the private and social losses and upon the relative magnitude of the marginal
deterrence effect - φ’(x)l(x) and the diversion effect -φ1(x|x)l(x). If -φ1(x*|x*)l(x*)
> (<) - φ’(x*)l(x*), then xo > (<) x*. Because of this ambiguity, it is also the case
that the individual level can be greater than or less than the socially optimal level.
To illustrate these relationships, Figure 1 shows a simulated equilibrium
under the individual, cooperative, and social first order conditions. For purposes
of the simulation, we assume that c(e) = αe2, and g(x) = G/(k(1+x)), and l(x) =
G/(λ(1+x)), where k ≥ λ. This latter assumption is made so that the gain from
unauthorized entry is less than the loss imposed on the site. When k = λ, the
unauthorized entry results in a costless transfer where the gain to the hacker
equals the loss to the site. With the specific forms assumed above, e(x) =
G/(2αk(1+x)), and p(x) = tG/(2hαk(1+x)).

21

See Shavell, 11 Intl Rev L & Econ 123 (cited in note 5).
Id.
23
One example would be acts of vandalism that cause large losses to property, but are of little
value to the vandal.
22
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[Insert Figure 1 about here]

Figure 1 shows a the first order conditions listed in Table 1 and the
equilibrium levels of security for k = λ = 20, G = 100, h = 16, t = 10, and α = .1.
The assumption that k = λ = 20 means that the gain to the hacker equals the loss
to the site, so that the direct social loss from unauthorized entry is zero. Under
these assumptions, the social level of security x** equals 3.2 units per site. The
cooperatively set level of security xo equals 4.3 units per site, and shows the
overincentive such cooperatives have to invest in security to prevent privately
costly but socially neutral transfers.
The example also illustrates the incentive to invest in security in order to
divert hackers towards other sites. The individual, uncoordinated level of security
x* equals 9.9 units per site, which is over three times the level of social level of
security x**.24

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

24

Normal scores have been extensively computed. See Herbert A. David and H. N. Nagaraja,
Order Statistics (Wiley-Interscience 3d ed, 2003).
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Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium where the unauthorized entry results in
a direct social loss. Specifically, the simulation depicted in Figure 2 shows the
equilibrium when k = 20, λ = 10, G = 100, h = 16, t = 10, and α = .1. Under
these assumptions, the ratio l(x)/g(x) = k/λ = 2. In order to model the individual
first order conditions, we assumed that the εi, and identically and independently
normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation equal to one. Under
these assumptions, the probability that site i will be the subject of any given attack
equals the probability that εi < x’ – x + ε(1), where ε(1) is the expected lowest order
statistic given h-1 draws (also known as the normal score when the εi, have a
standard normal distribution).25 Under these assumptions, the social level of
security x** equals 5.1 units, the cooperatively set level, xo equals 5.7 units, and
the individual level x* equals 14.3 units. The introduction of socially costly cyber
attacks moves the cooperative and social level of security closer together, but
increases the divergence between the individual, uncoordinated level of security
and the social level of security.
Uncoordinated production of security does not necessarily produce the
large overincentive illustrated in Figure 2. To illustrate this, Figure 3 shows the
equilibrium when standard deviation of the εi is increased to 20. A larger
standard deviation reduces the individual incentive to produce security so that the
individual level x* falls to 5.5 units, below the cooperative level, but still above,
25

In the example, this is true both in absolute and percentage terms.
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in this example, the individual level. Intuitively, a larger standard deviation for
the εi, reduces the marginal effect of expenditures on x by making it more likely
that marginal expenditures will be overcome by the random noise.26

[Insert Figure 3 about here]

III. PUBLIC SECURITY GOODS
Prior models have examined the provision of private security goods such as door
locks or security guards. In the cybersecurity context, expenditures on security
are likely to be investments in information about the nature and frequency of past
attacks, information about pending attacks, and information about the existence of
vulnerabilities to and potential defenses against cyberattacks. Such information is
a classic public good that once produced, can be consumed by multiple sites in a
nonrivalrous fashion.27
In this section, the model presented in Section I is modified to examine the
private and social incentives to produce intangible security goods that have the
characteristics of public goods. In order to model the production and use of
public good security expenditures, we assume that a unit of x produced by one site

26

For a similar analysis of the effect of uncertainty in the litigation context, see Richard Craswell
and John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J L, Econ, & Org 279 (1986).
27
See Amitai Aviram and Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing, 55
Ala L Rev 231 (2004) (noting non-rivalrous nature of information, and analyzing strategic barrier
to information sharing).
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can be used in a nonrivalrous fashion by the other h – 1 sites.28 Under these
assumptions, the social objective function would be to minimize the costs of
precaution, effort at crime, and the social loss of crime:

x + t(c(e(x)) + e(x)s(x)).

(15)

The first order condition is given by:

-t(c’(e)e’(x) + s’(x)e(x) + s(x)e’(x)) = 1.

(16)

The social first order condition can be rewritten as

28

Note this does not imply that security expenditures are conducted in a centralized fashion.
Indeed, the collection of information often requires examining global information from many
individual sites in order to analyze and detect patterns of attacks. Thus, the benefit of a given total
level of security expenditures will exhibit network effect – that is, a given level of security
expenditures distributed over h sites will have a greater effect in reducing losses to the site and
gains to the criminal than the same level of expenditure by a single site. In terms of the model, l
= l(x,s), where l2(x,s) < 0. Similarly, information collected from numerous diverse sources may
be more valuable than the same number of repeated observations by a few firms. See generally,
Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge In Society, 35 Am Econ Rev 519 (1945). This analysis
suggests that firms have a great incentive to share information in such a setting. Similar incentives
for sharing of information between competitive firms have raised antitrust concerns. For example,
McCarran Ferguson Act (U.S. Code Title 15, Chapter 20) makes the cooperative gathering of data
for the purpose of ratemaking exempt from the federal antitrust statutes when undertaken by state
regulated insurance companies. For an analysis of information sharing and antitrust in the
cybersecurity context, see Aviram and Tor, 55 Ala L Rev 231 (cited in note 27). For economic
analyses of information sharing between competing firms, see Olivier Armantier and Oliver
Richard, Exchanges of Cost Information in the Airline Industry, 34 Rand J Econ 461 (2003); Barry
S. Eisenberg, Information Exchange Among Competitors: The Issue of Relative Value Scales for
Physicians’ Services, 23 J L & Econ 461 (1981); Esther Gal-Or, Information TransmissionCournot and Bertrand Equilibria, 53 Rev Econ Stud 85 (1986).
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-h(φ’(x)l(x) + φ (x)s’(x)) = 1

(17)

Ceteris paribus, the level of security applied to each individual is higher
than in the private goods case because each unit of x is now simultaneously
applied to h potential victims. Total spending can be less than in the private
goods case, as any unit of x is not separately incurred by each of the h potential
victims.
If the h sites cooperatively choose a level of expenditures, they would
attempt to minimize:

h φ (x)l(x) + x.

(18)

The first order condition is given by

-h(φ’(x)l(x) + φ (x)l’(x)) = 1.

(19)

Comparing (19) to the social first order condition (17), we see that the
public goods case preserves the relative relationship between the cooperative and
socially optimal level of security expenditures. That is, cooperative spending
results in the overproduction of public as well as private security goods due to an

18
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excessive incentive to reduce the size of transfers that do not represent a social
loss.
Finally, consider the case where individuals choose to invest in public
security goods. Consider first the case where such investments cannot be
appropriated by those who make them, so that any private investments can be
used by all participants in the market. The objective function on each individual
is to minimize:

φ (xT)l(xT) + x,

(20)

where xT equals the total expenditures on x by all h potential victims.

The first order condition equals

-φ’(xT)l(xT) – φ (xT)l’(xT) = 1.

(21)

Table 2 summarizes the first order conditions for the public goods case.

Table 2 – First Order Conditions – Public Goods Case
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First Order Condition
Social

-h[φ’(x)l(x) + φ (x)s’(x)] = 1.

Individual

-φ’(xT)l(xT) - φ(xT)l’(xT) = 1.

Cooperatives

-h[φ’(x)l(x) + φ (x)l’(x)] = 1.

Note that by definition φ’(xT) = φ’(x), and that the first order condition
(21) is satisfied at xT = x*, the cooperative level of expenditure in the private
goods case. The total level of expenditures implied by the first order condition
(21) is less than the cooperative level implied by (19). Note that this result differs
from the private goods case. As shown in the simulations contained in Section II,
it is possible for the individual uncoordinated level of private security
expenditures to exceed those that would be set cooperatively. Intuitively, the
potential to divert criminals towards another site can provide a powerful marginal
incentive to spend on security. However, in the public goods case considered
here, private expenditures simultaneously protect others’ sites. Thus, such
expenditures do not serve to divert hacker from the investor’s site toward these
other sites.
Moreover, the first order conditions do not yield a unique allocation of the
security expenditures among the h sites. Thus, while individual expenditures
equal to x*/h by all h sites is an equilibrium, there are also multiple equilibria in
which h-k sites spend zero, and k spend x*/k. Any individual site would prefer
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and equilibrium where they were one of the h-k spending zero. Indeed, this result
is the familiar free-riding problem in the presence of non-appropriable public
goods. The existence of multiple equilibria and the potential for free-riding
suggests that some mechanism to mitigate the free riding problem and/or solve the
coordination problem is required.
To gain a sense of the relative magnitude of the problems, Figure 3 shows
the results of a market simulation of relative levels of private security under the
individual, cooperative, and social first order conditions for a public good. For
the purposes of this simulation, assume the same functional forms as the private
good simulations above.

[Insert Figure 4 about here]

Figure 4 shows the individual, cooperative and social first order conditions
when the entry results in a pure transfer. Specifically, the simulations depicted in
Figure 1 assume that k = λ = 20, G = 100, h = 50, t = 30, and α = .1. Under
these assumptions, the first order conditions yield a cooperative level of
precaution equals 18.5 units, and an individual level of precaution equals 4.3
units. This is compared to the social level of precaution, which equals 14.5 units.
Thus, for this particular simulation, the cooperatively set level of precaution
results in a 27.6 percent increase over the level given by the social first order
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condition. Not that, in contrast to the private goods case in which the individual,
uncoordinated level of security exceeded the social level, the individual first order
condition in the public goods case yields a total level of precaution that is 29
percent of the level given by the social first order condition.

[Insert Figure 5 about here]

Figure 5 shows the first order conditions when k is increased to 50. Under
these assumptions, the ratio g(x)/l(x) = 20/50 = .4, so that the gain from an
authorized entry is 40% of the loss caused the unauthorized entry. Under these
assumptions, the individual, social, and cooperative level of security equals 2.9
units, 12.3 units, and 13.4 units respectively. Note that the cooperative level of
precaution is only 8.9 percent greater than the social level, while the individual
level is only 23 percent of the social level. Thus, under these conditions, an
increase in the relative social cost of unauthorized entry will decrease the
overproduction associated with the cooperative level of security, and increase the
underproduction associated with uncoordinated security expenditures.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the relative efficiency of coordinated
and individual uncoordinated public good security expenditures will depend upon
the gain to harm ratio. The issue of social versus private losses in the
cybersecurity context is a complex one. Take for example a directed denial of
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service attack that prevents consumers from accessing a particular e-commerce
site, which at first blush, seems analogous to vandalism, an act with a low gain to
loss ratio. However, if customers make purchases at a competitor’s site, then the
lost sales of the attacked site would be private but not social losses, thus resulting
is a gain to loss ratio that is close to one. The release of destructive worms and
viruses may be more akin to vandalism. In many cases, the release of the
destructive or disruptive worm or virus is not apparently associated with an
attempt to directly or indirectly transfer resources, with the apparent benefit to the
person releasing it being the utility he obtains from the act.29 As noted above, in
such a case, any distortion between the cooperative and social level of private
security expenditures will be small.

IV. THE PRIVATE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SECURITY GOODS
The results from the private good case suggest that uncoordinated markets may
under or over produce private security relative to the social optimum. Further, in
29

On the other hand, worms and viruses may be ways in which hackers are collecting information
about how to lower the cost of transferring wealth in the future. In this sense, the release of a
worm of virus may be a form of planning expenditures. These expenditures can induce marginal
social costs by accelerating the level of defensive as well as offensive security expenditures, which
are social costs. Thus, claims by hacker that they are providing a social service by exposing
potential security flaws may not be true, especially if the flaw is publicly disclosed. Any benefits
from the information gained from the worm may be outweighed by the direct costs caused by the
virus, and by the increased present value of resources induced to protect sites from such worms.
Even if the information gained is not publicly disclosed, the accelerated rate of defensive
expenditures that are induced by such attacks may increase social costs. For a discussion of the
positive informational externalities that result from the commission of crimes, see Kermit Daniel
and John R. Lott, Jr., Should Criminal Penalties Include Third-Party Avoidance Costs?, 14 J
Legal Stud 523 (1995).
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this model, collective action to provide private good security expenditures will
result in the overproduction of private security expenditures. Thus, while
uncoordinated markets will not in general produce the first-best allocation of
private security expenditures, neither will cooperative security investments.
The analysis in Section II shows that the public good nature of
cybersecurity investments presents additional issues that are not present in the
private goods case. The nonrivalrous nature of public good security expenditures
suggests that such goods, once produced, should be made available for use by all
sites. On the other hand, absent some way to appropriate the gains from public
security investments, individual firms or groups may not have sufficient
individual incentives to make such investments.
One implication is that the presence of public goods in the cybersecurity
context would result in a great incentive to form cooperative security
arrangements in such situations.30 However, absent the existence of enforceable
intellectual property rights or some other mechanism to appropriate the returns
from private security expenditures, potential victims would have an incentive to

30

Indeed, the use of prior contracts is suggested by Friedman as a solution to externalities present
in the private law enforcement context. See Friedman, 8 J Legal Stud 299 (cited in note 1). For
an analysis of the use of prior contracting as a way to produce public goods, including innovation,
see Ben T. Yu. Prior Contracting and Innovation, 24 J L & Econ 215 (1981). See also Frye, 58
Bus L at 361 (cited in note 8) (describing private sector groups that have formed to share
information and address cybersecurity issues, including Information Sharing and Assessment
Centers (ISACs) in the financial services, energy, transportation, vital human services, and
communication information services sectors, as well as the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure
Security (PCIS), which coordinates the activities of the industry based ISACs).
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free ride by refusing to join the cooperative security venture, then free riding on
the public good output of the coalition.
To illustrate this point, consider the example used in the simulation
contained underlying Figure 4, with k = 50, λ = 20, G = 100, h = 50, t = 30, and
α = .1. Under these assumptions, the cooperative level of security equals 13.4
units with h sites participating. If each of the h sites agrees ex-ante to pay an
equal share of the total costs of security, the expected loss plus pro-rata share
equals .413 for each site.
Now suppose one site refuses to join. The remaining h-1 sites will seek to
minimize:

(h-1) φ (x)l(x) + x.

(22)

The cooperative level of security chosen by h-1 sites equals 13.3 units. If
the site that refused to join the cooperative is able to free ride on the expenditures
of the h-1 sites in the cooperative, it will face a lower expected loss equal to .147.
Thus, the slight increase in expected loss resulting from the lower security
expenditures is more than offset by the savings of their pro rata share of
cooperative security costs. Further, it can be demonstrated that a there is a similar
incentive to defect from the h-1, h-2 … 2 size cooperative under these
circumstances.
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Concerns over inadequate private investment in cybersecurity have led the
federal government to suggest that some type of government regulation may be
required.31 It has been suggested, for example, that the government mandate
minimum security standards, or require that private firms disclose the nature and
frequency of cyber attacks aimed at their sites and networks.32 However, such
government mandates can generate their own inefficiencies. For example, the
government choice of standard may result in a choice that is inferior to whatever
potentially imperfect choice would have been made by the market. 33 Further,
government choice of a standard may stifle experimentation and innovation the
can lead to dynamic inefficiency.34 Mandatory disclosure can be overinclusive,
requiring the disclosure of information with a marginal value less than the
marginal cost of collection and disclosure.35 Further, mandatory disclosure can

See Jonathan Krim, Help Fix Cybersecurity or Else, U.S. Tells Industry, Washington Post E02
(Dec 4, 2003) (Bush administration official warning regulation looms if private companies do not
increase private efforts at providing cyber-security). The Bush administration has taken a
relatively hands off approach to this issue. See, e.g., The National Strategy to Protect Cyberspace
(February 2003).
32
See Frye, 58 Bus L 349 (cited in note 8).
33
See, e.g., Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Winners, Losers and Microsoft:
Competition and Antitrust in High Technology (Independent Institute, 1999).
34
See Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, State Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 51
Emory L J 1 (2002).
35
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 Va L Rev 669 (1984) (discussing mandatory disclosure rules contained in the
securities laws).
31
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induce firms to engage in less information collection, and greater free riding
problems.36
One an alternative to government standards or mandated disclosure would
be for the government to encourage firms to produce information through use of
property rights to information.37 What is critical is that sites that undertake
cooperative investments in public good security expenditures find some way to
exclude non-payers.38 A mechanism to exclude non-payers will prevent a firm
refusing to join the collective from free riding on the expenditures of the
collective. Further, given that the level of protection applied to a firm that does
not join the collective will be below that applied to members of the collective, non
members will suffer more frequent attacks. If this is not done, then sites will
refuse to join the cooperative and attempt to free ride off the information provided
by the cooperative.
As is the case with any idea or informational public good, the private
production of public goods can be induced through intellectual property
See D. Bruce Johnsen, The Limits of Mandatory Disclosure: Regulatory Taking under the
Investment Company Act, mimeo, George Mason University (2003) (discussing SEC disclosure
rules and their suppression of information production).
37
See generally, Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J L & Econ 293
(1970).
38
The clear definition of intellectual property rights, as well as members’ responsibility for
preventing the further dissemination of sensitive information, should be central issue when an
information sharing group or security cooperative is formed. No systematic analysis of the
contractual agreements regarding intellectual property rights and the maintenance of secrecy
currently has been done. A closely related survey of the treatment of intellectual property rights
for private standard setting organizations found wide variation in the treatment of intellectual
property rights. See Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting
Organizations, 90 Cal L Rev 1889 (2002).
36
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protection. For example, security research firms use proprietary technology to
collect and analyze data about cyber attacks.39 While security expenditures that
involve the collection and analysis of information may not be protected under the
federal copyright laws, or rise to the level of novelty or nonobviousness required
for protection under the federal patent laws,40 the computer programs used to
track and analyze such data may be. Further, patent protection may be available
for novel and nonobvious computer programs and business methods.
Even if use of statutory intellectual property right protection, such as
copyright or patents, is not be feasible, security collectives can use secrecy,
supported by contractual restrictions on the members, to prevent widespread free
riding.41 In this context, secrecy means that the existence and content of a
specific security level x is not disclosed ex-ante to other sites or to potential
hackers. This form of secrecy has two offsetting effects. First, it allows
individuals to appropriate the gains from their private expenditures by precluding
other sites from appropriating information it possesses.42 To the extent secrecy

See, e.g., Leslie Walker, The View from Symatec’s Security Central, Washington Post E01(Jan
9, 2003) (describing the use of proprietary software and systems to monitor and analyze the nature
and frequency of cyber attacks. The information and analysis is subsequently sold to subscriber
networks).
40
Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Fiest Publications v Rural Telephone Service, 499
US 340 (1991), protection for factual compilations under the federal copyright laws is limited.
Congress has recently considered federal database protection. See, e.g., Database and Collections
of Information Misappropriation Act, HR 3261, October 8, 2003.
41
See, generally Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, Privacy and Firms, 79 Den L Rev
526 (2002).
42
Note that such protection is not perfect. See, e.g., William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner,
The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law at 354-371 (Belknap, 2003) (discussing the
39
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prevents free-riding, its use can encourage private expenditures on public good
security expenditures. On the other hand, use of secrecy may not allow for the
diverting effect generated by expenditures that are publicly disclosed. Thus, its
use may suppress the incentive for individuals to expend private resources on
public good security expenditures.
To examine the effect of secrecy consider the objective function for each
cooperative of size s. Such a cooperative will attempt to minimize:

s* φ (x|x’)l(x|x’) + x,

(21)

If secrecy is not perfect, both the probability and the amount of the loss
are conditional on x’, the amount spent by the other h - s potential victims. The
conditional probability and loss amounts capture two distinct effects. The first is
the diversion effect that results from criminals substituting into less protected
targets. The second effect is the spillover from expenditures by others x’ that can
be appropriated by the cooperative s. The first order condition equals

-s(φ1(x|x’)l(x|x’) + φ (x|x’)l’(x|x’)) = 1.

(22)

economics of trade secret law). However, in the context of some cybersecurity settings, a timing
advantage can be used to appropriate the returns from expenditures on information. For example,
timely notice of IP addresses being used to launch distributed denial of service attacks or other
types of cyber attacks allow the targets to block incoming mail from these addresses before large
scale damage is incurred. Small delays in the transmission of this information can delay such
preventative measures, and will increase the amount of loss from such attacks.
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To simplify matters, suppose that secrecy turns the security goods into the
equivalent of an unobserved private good so that security measures are not
observable ex-ante, either by criminal or by other potential victims. In this case,

φ1(x|x’) = 0, as both the diversion effect and the spillover effect of expenditures
by others on the probability of loss will be zero. Further, under these
circumstances, there will be no spillover effect of expenditures by others on the
amount of loss, i.e., l’(x|x’) = l’(x). If the cooperative of size s takes the frequency
of an attack φ as exogenous, the first order condition becomes

-sφ l’(x) = 1

(23)

If s = 1, then each individual spends less than the cooperative level. Using
the numbers and the example used to generate Figure 2, and if we assume that φ =

φ (x),43 then each of the h sites will set their level of security at 2.1 units. The
total amount of security produced is 2.1*50 = 105 units. However, only 2.1 units
of security would be applied to any given site. In contrast, the uncoordinated
Hially-Ü}ô the criminals expectation of the equilibrium level of expenditures on security x may
differ from that implied by the first order condition (23). If criminals have operated in an
environment of low security in the past, and are not informed ex-ante of the increase in x, the
criminal’s estimate of x would be lower than the actual level of x, and his estimate of φ will be
higher than φ (x). Given this, the levels of spending given by (23) will underestimate the actual
level. Over time, criminals will adjust their estimate of x over time so that φ = φ(x), and sites will
adjust x until equilibrium is reached.
43
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individual equilibrium level of security would result in the production of 2.9 units
of security that would be simultaneously applied to all h sites. Thus, the result of
individual investments with secrecy would be a low protection, high cost
equilibrium.
This result suggests the inefficiency of investment by individual firms in
public good security expenditures that are kept secret. However, such an
inefficiency would be eliminated if individual firms formed collectives. The
individual members would have to agree ex-ante to pay a pro-rata share of the
costs of the security collective. Furthermore, they would also have to agree to
protect the information generated and shared by members of the collective from
disclosure to non-members. 44 As noted above, failure to do so would give
individual sites an incentive to free ride by remaining outside the cooperative.
To see this point, suppose that s = h. A collective with h members would
produce 10.4 units of security. This level is below both the collective level given
in equation (21) and the social level given in equation (17). Thus, if secrecy is
necessary for the stability of cooperative spending, there could be some
underproduction of security. However, this is not necessarily the case. Because,
the cooperative level of security is greater than the social optimum, the reduced
incentive to spend on secrecy can move security expenditures toward the socially

44

The security collectives would likely also include requirements that members maintain
minimum security standards, and may require that members collect and report information in a
timely manner.

31
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

optimal level. Consider, for example, the case where the unauthorized entry
results in a pure transfer, so that k = 20. In this case, secrecy results in a security
expenditure of 14.5 units, which coincides with the social level.

V.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis has examined the incentive to produce private security
expenditures. While prior analyses have examined the provision of security
goods that have the characteristics of private goods, the analysis in this paper
examined expenditures on security, such as information, that have the
characteristics of public goods.
In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated
security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods
case can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to
free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to
facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of
information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of
such organizations.
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FIGURE 1 – Equilibrium with Private Security Goods – Pure Transfer Case
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FIGURE 2 – Equilibrium with Private Security Goods – Social Loss Case
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FIGURE 3 – Equilibrium with Private Security Goods – Social Loss, High
Variance Case
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FIGURE 4 – Equilibrium with Public Security Goods – Pure Transfer Case
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FIGURE 5 – Equilibrium with Public Security Goods – Social Loss Case
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